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Summary 
There are at least five general reasons why market-based policies fail to address 
some of the most basic environmental objectives. This study evaluates the available 
biophysical and economic data against these criteria and concludes that market-
based approaches should be employed cautiously in pollution control under the 
present system and the available technology for farming in the lake area.  The most 
effective market-based instrument to control pollution, in this case, seems to be 
negative incentives, as the public net cost of farming is extremely higher than the 
private net benefits.  However, the intensity of taxes that would be effective in this 
regard would definitely results negative net farm benefits.  The principle alternative, 
emission trading, would be effective with a highly regulated system given long-
term political willingness to address the problem effectively.  




The consideration of the use of market based policies (economic instruments) goes 
back to the early 1920s when Pigou addressed the issue of externalities and the 
possible use of charges or subsidies that could bring a market back into equilibrium.  
The theory behind the now popular market-based approach, the trade permit system   
to deal with pollution problems arose in the late 1960s in work by Dale (1968) and 
Crocker (1966).  They argued that the right to emit pollutants or use natural resources 
would be distributed to stakeholders but could then be sold.  Market negotiations 
between potential permit buyers and sellers would occur and results in the 
reallocation of these permits across the stakeholders. Woodward (2005) described a 
perfect version of such a program.  Accordingly, a cap is first placed on total 
pollution emissions.  Then permits equal to the cap are distributed to the polluters.  
Finally, a market develops in which the sellers are those firms with relatively low 
abatement costs who end up reducing emissions by more than initially required; 
buyers are those with relatively high abatement costs who end up reducing emissions 
by less than initially required.  The text book result is an efficient market equilibrium 
in which a pollution target is achieved at lowest cost or a resource is used in a way 
that yields the most value to the society.  
 Proposed Waikato regional plan variation 5 (Waikato Regional Council Policy Series 
2005/03) too suggests a N2 emission trading approach to counter the pollution 
problem in the Lake Taupo catchment, the largest Lake in New Zealand.  The lake 
Taupo is known for its dramatic vistas, deep clear near pristine waters, superb trout 
and volcanic heritage.  However, Rae et al. (2000) reported that the water quality of 
the Lake is declining.  Accordingly, development and intensification of the 
surrounding rural and urban lands started in 1930s has increased the amount of 
nitrogen entering the Lake through ground water and rivers.  This has promoted algal 
and phytoplankton growth in the Lake.   
 
Sundakov (2006) analyzed the Waikato regional plan variation 5 and indicated that 
the emission trading option suggested is not going to be effective due to two main 
reasons namely, grand parenting to allocate Nitrogen Discharge Allowance (NDA), 
and the major deficiencies of using Overseer (nutrient budgeting model) to estimate 
leaching.  Sinner et al. (2005) explore three case studies (including transferable water 
permits in Tasman District and Waikato Region) in New Zealand to study the 
adoption of market- based instruments for resource management.  The study 
concludes that market based instruments (MBI) are difficult to implement if they 
threaten the position of existing users, it is important to have clear objectives, and 
norms and values can be an obstacle to MBIs especially where they help to protect 
the interest of key stakeholders. However, value based opposition can be overcome if 
practical concerns are addressed. 
 
This study, an evaluation of the water pollution problem in the Lake taupo with 
especial reference to the suitability of market based instrument to address the 
problem was based on the literature review on environmental markets and the related 
economic theories.  In this regard, an analytical framework was developed base on 
the argument by Ackerman and Gallagher (2000).  Accordingly, there are at least 
five general reasons why market based instruments fail to address some of the most 
basic environmental objectives.  Further, an overview of water quality trading in the 
US was carried out by using the comprehensive survey data of water quality trading 
and offset initiatives in the US by Breetz et al. (2004).  The special features of 
successful and unsuccessful trading programs were then compared with the lake 
Taupo scenario to judge the effectiveness of market base instruments in case of 
addressing the pollution problem in the Lake.  
 
The limits of the market-based environmental policy 
approaches 
During the 1990s, a near consensus emerged in policy making circles for a sharp 
turn away from past patterns of regulations towards the theoretically greater 
efficiency and lower cost of environmental taxes, tradable emission permits, and 
other market incentives (Stavins et al. 1988, 1991).  According to Anderson and 
Leal (1991), the most passionate free marketers seek to roll back all government 
programs, laws, and regulations that affect business and property.  For them the 
market is answer regardless of the question, and even irreversible climate change is 
just another opportunity for private profits.  They suggest two avenues for dealing 
with global warming.   The first take changes in the earth’s temperature as given 
and ask whether individuals have the incentives to respond with innovative solutions.  The second focus on the evaluation of the property rights to the 
atmosphere. 
The blueprint offered by the market is explained in general equilibrium theory.  
Under a series of idealized assumptions, a competitive economy is guaranteed to 
have an equilibrium which is Pareto optimal, and every Pareto-optimal outcome is 
equilibrium for some set of initial conditions.  According to Ackerman and 
Gallagher (2000), there is no guarantee that equilibrium of a general equilibrium 
model is either unique or stable.  Intensive theoretical analysis has found no way 
around this problem, and in fact has found that that dynamic behaviour of small 
(mathematically manageable) general equilibrium models is not necessarily a guide 
to the behaviour of related larger and more realistic models. 
Bergh et al. (2000) argues that in reality the assumption of general equilibrium 
theory are inconsistent with what we know about people, firms, and technology.  
The neo classical behavioural model and its assumption of well-informed narrowly 
defined maximization clash with the results of most social sciences and with 
common sense.  According to Arthur (1994), major firms routinely failed to be as 
small and competitive as the theory requires; oligopoly and monopoly are obvious 
persistent facts of life.  Path dependent technologies, involving learning by doing 
and network effects, further undercut the presumption that market outcomes are 
reliably optimal or efficient. 
According to Ackerman and Gallagher (2000), the market as a blue print fails 
because there are significant public purposes that cannot be achieved by prices and 
markets alone.  In some causes, society may intentionally and appropriately choose 
to get the prices wrong in order to pursue more important goals. Ackerman and 
Gallagher further emphasized on at least five general reasons why market based 
policies fail to address some of the basic environmental objectives.  The details of 
these reasons and their relevant to proposed N2 emission market of the Lake Taupo 
are discussed in the following sections. 
a. Large, irreversible damages must be prevented 
The main argument here is that the market does not guarantee that producers will 
always do the right thing; it only ensures that those who do the wrong thing too 
often will go out of business.  Implicit in the perfect competition model is a process 
of trial and error in which unsuccessful producers may do the wrong things for a 
while before giving up and trying a different line of work.  This is a useful way to 
make many resource allocation decisions if there is no great social cost or lasting 
harms caused by a few failed experiments (Koopman, 1951; Krutilla, 1967).  In 
fact, it is hard to imagine a better way to choose which restaurants should serve our 
community; the economic and environmental impacts of unsuccessful restaurants 
are minimal.  But the same process of trial and error is less attractive as a strategy 
for disposal of high-level radioactive waste, where it is essential to be right the first 
time and every time.  When the potential damages are large and irreversible, as 
with radioactive waste, then society cannot afford the experimental learning 
process that is implied by market competition.   Many environmental problems are 
more analogous to the urgent question of nuclear waste disposal than to the benign 
issues of consumer preferences and restaurant choice.  Threat of extinction of endangered species, destruction of irreplaceable wildernesses and other ecosystems, 
and emission of toxic and carcinogenic pollutants, all involve large irreversible 
damages.  The market can safely play a role on these issues only in a firmly 
regulated context, intentionally constrained by high minimum standards safeguard 
the interest of nature and humanity. 
Scheffer et al. (2001) showed how natural ecosystems often respond in abrupt, 
sometimes catastrophic ways to prolong stress.  In aquatic ecosystems this stress 
may arise from increased nutrient inputs, invasive species (e.g. ‘oxygen weeds), 
extreme weather events and/or water level changes. According to Hamilton (2005), 
the cost of restoration amplify greatly once lake degradation exceeds a ‘tipping 
point’ when the lake switches into a low-water clarity state often characterised by 
loss of weed beds in shallow lakes or increase cyanobacteria (blue-green algae) 
populations in deep lakes.  Blooms of blue green algae occurred in Lake Taupo in 
2001 and 2003.  These findings confirm that the possibility of large irreversible 
damages to the Lake Taupo if the current level of nutrient leaching going to be 
continued in the future. 
b. Outcomes far in the future are important 
Discounting, the standard method for comparison of cost and benefits that occur at 
different times, is indispensable for near-term decisions but nonsensical for the 
long run.  However, by using a discount rate for various projects which have long 
term environmental impacts, the policy makers implicitly imposed a specific 
pattern of preferences regarding the relative welfare of present and future 
generations (Howarth and Norgard, 1993).  In method of discounting, the benefits 
far in the future have a very small present value.  Hartwick, (1977) and Solow 
(1986) argued that very low weight effect of discounting on the far future benefits 
had slow and minimize the current spending on the long-run environmental 
objectives.  According to Bromley (1998), the only reasonable conclusion of using 
discount rates to weigh the cost and benefits in the future is that economic theory 
does not offer a reasonable understanding of our responsibility to future 
generations. 
According to Hamilton and Wilkins (2005), Lake Taupo will respond only very 
slowly to changes in land use.  It will take on average 45 years for stream inflow 
concentrations to reflect land use change in the catchment and around 15 years for 
levels of nutrients and phytoplankton in the lake to approach equilibrium with 
stream flow nutrient concentrations.  Therefore, that present-day lake water quality 
has equilibrated with land use of the 1940s.  These biological research findings 
emphasize the fact the relevance of long term effects in this case. 
c. Many environmental values are not commodities that can be priced 
By trying to value environmental goods economists assume that environmental 
values can be treated as commodities like any others.  This approach is 
problematical on several levels.  There are serious conceptual and technical 
critiques of the standard methods of monetizing environmental damages by 
economist and lawyers’ alike (Diamond and Hausman, 1994; Harvard Law Review 
1992).  Economists frequently rely on “contingent valuation” surveys that ask people to place a hypothetical dollar value on some aspect of the environment; the 
question does not always produce a meaningful answer.   According to Costanza 
(2006) these sorts of methods are useful but they are limited to the kind of services 
that people have some knowledge about, for example recreation, cultural amenities, 
aesthetic kind of services.  But they may be not be very helpful for services that 
people do not know much about, like water supply, climate protection or soil 
formation.  However, Costanza emphasized the importance of valuing these 
services by using broad range of methods and acknowledge that people may or 
may not be well informed about the contribution of ecosystem services to their 
welfare. 
A problem is that every unit of commodity typically sells at the same price; five 
kilo of apple is worth five times as much as one.  However, for pollutants with 
threshold effects or critical levels, five times of emission may have vastly more 
than five times the impact of one kilo of emission.  According to Ackerman and 
Gallagher (2000), in contrast to traditional regulations, market based policies such 
as emission trading is more prone to creating “hot spots” where critical levels of 
pollutants are exceeded. 
On the most fundamental level, there are deep ethical, philosophical, and religious 
objection to assigning dollar values to human or other life (Anderson, 1993:   
Kelman, 1981).  For many people, the protection of endangered species and unique 
natural habitat, or the prevention of avoidable deaths and injuries, involve a realm 
of fundamental principles that transcend the market.  Vant and Bromley (1994) 
argue that from this perspective, monetization of human life and health, or the 
existence of other species, is either meaningless or degrading.  Accordingly, it is 
important to talk about these principles and their policy implications, but that 
conversation cannot be reduced to purely monetary terms. 
Costanza et al. (1997) has attempted to value the world’s ecosystem services and 
natural capital.  The study included the current economic value of 17 ecosystem 
services for 16 biomes, based on published studies and few original calculations.  
For the entire biosphere, the value (most of which outside the market) is estimated 
to be in the range of US$ 16-54 trillion per year, with an average of US$ 33 trillion 
per year.  According to them, because of the nature of uncertainties, this must be 
considered a minimum estimate.  Interestingly global gross national product total is 
around US$ 18 trillion per year.  There is no value estimation for the Lake Taupo.  
In this study, value estimation for the Lake and surrounding ecosystem was 
conducted by using the Costanza study data (Table 1).  The value of the Lake and 
the surrounding forest ecosystem is estimated to be around 662 million US$ per 
year and this is around 1.04 billion NZ$ per year in current currency rates (1NZ$= 
0.64US$).  However, this is an under estimation of the real value as pointed out in 
the Costanza study.  Environmental services assumed to be a normal good in that 
study and thus supply and demand curves and the total surplus is similar to the 
figure 1.  However, many ecosystem services are substitutable up to a point and 
their demand curves probably look more like figure 2.  In other words demand 
approaches infinity as the quantity available approaches some minimum necessary 
level of services, and thus the consumer surplus as well as the total economic value 
approaches infinity. Table 1: Estimated Values for Different Ecosystem Services of the Lake Taupo and 
its Surrounding Forest. 
________________________________________________________________ 
Ecosystem                       Value 1994                         Value*              Value**                  
Services                         US$/Forest/ha /yr               of forest            of Lake              
                                      (US$/Lake/ha /yr)                      ($/year x 10
2)         
__________________________________________________________________ 
Climate regulation                  141                               200784                  
Disturbance regulation               2                                   2848 
Water regulation                         2 (5445)                       2848            3354120 
Water Supply                              3 (2117)                       4272            1304072 
Erosion Control                          96                             136704 
Soil Formation                           10                               14240 
Nutrient Cycling                      361                              514064   
Waste Treatment                        87 (665)                    123888               409640 
Biological Control                       2                                  2348 
Food Production                        43 (41)                        61232                  25256 
Raw Materials                         138                              196512 
Genetic Resources                    16                                 22784 
Recreation                                 66 (230)                       93984               141680 
Cultural                                       2                                   2848 
Total                                       969 (8498)                   1379856            5234768 
Grand Total                                                                                           6614624 
__________________________________________________________________ 
* Total area under forest is 142400ha  
** Total area of the Lake is 61600ha       Fig 1: Supply and Demand Curves, Net Rents and 








           
          Fig 2: Supply and Demand Curves, Net Rents (NR) 
           and Consumer Surplus (CS)  for Normal Goods 







 d. Volatile market prices can cause wasteful misallocation 
As stock market movements indicate the investment that made yesterday may no 
longer profitable today when the price change is extremely volatile.  This problem 
can also affect the environment when volatile markets send mixed signals about the 
value of environmental policies and initiatives. Very high prices for recycled 
materials in 1995 inspired more than a billion dollars of investment in new 
recycled paper mills; by 1997 those new mills had closed, most of them bankrupt 
(Ackerman and Gallagher, 2000).  High oil prices in the early 1980s drove the auto 
industry to retool for small car production, immediately after prices fell consumers 
went back buying big cars. The relevant of these criteria for the current study is 
negligible as there is no much volatility in the concerned market activities. 
e. Relative importance of market based instruments and traditional 
regulatory approaches 
The two strategies provide different benefits.  The market maximizes consumer 
choice and creates incentives for cost minimization; the government can supply 
public gods, minimize transaction costs, and create a transparent standard of 
fairness.  The relative importance of these contrasting strengths will differ from 
case to case. 
Economist have analyzed the conditions under which market incentives are more 
or less effective; for example when pollution approaches threshold beyond which 
damages rise rapidly, the rational for strict emission controls becomes stronger.  
There is also some evidence that market incentives, like any other policy, are less 
effective in practice than they were projected to be in theory (Gustafsson, 1998). 
Finally, market based policies frequently involve taxes.  The principle alternative, 
emission trading, involves high start-up and transaction costs, and is not 
appropriate in every case.  Traditional regulation, involving rules that lower or 
prohibit certain emissions, may be more politically feasible considering the 
sensitiveness of people to the taxes (Ackerman and Gallagher, 2000).  The cause of 
Lake Taupo problem also a highly politically sensitive aspect as main activities 
responsible for the pollution is farming.  Therefore, instruments like regulating 
might be more attractive than taxing both for farmers as well as politicians.  The 
propose emission trading is blend of regulation and market activities and thus 
seems to be palatable for both farmers and policy makers to begin with. 
Table 2 indicates a evaluation of the above mentioned five criteria for the most 
effective emission trading market in the history, the SO2 market in the USA and for 
the propose emission trading market in the Lake Taupo. The effectiveness criteria 
for the use of market based instruments fit well in the case of SO2 market, where as 
most of the criteria are not fit well in the case of propose emission trading market 
in the Lake Taupo area. 
 
  
Table 2: MBI effectiveness criteria valuation in Case of SO2 Market in the USA 
and Propose Emission Trading Market in the Lake Taupo Catchment  
__________________________________________________________________ 
Criteria             SO2 Market                    Emission Market in the Taupo Lake 
__________________________________________________________________ 
1. Damage        Seems to be                    irreversible or very costly to reverse after 
                          reversible                       exceeding the tipping point. 
2. Effect            prompt following           Long term, Take 40-60 years to appear    
                          emission 
3. Humanity / 
    Biodiversity     not prominent              Prominent 
4. Prices                not volatile                 not volatile 
5. Regulation         expensive &              Trading seems to be expensive due to  
                               Inflexible                   high transaction cost (NPS-NPS trading) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Effectiveness of Emission Trading  
Despite the above mentioned criteria been not well fit for market base approaches 
in most environmental related problems, the emission trading is a popular approach 
in many environmental related problems.  The most important aspect of this 
approach is that it combines both regulatory and market approaches to address the 
environmental related issues.  However, effectiveness of this approach dependent 
on how far the system is capable of sticking to the regulated levels while 
maintaining and encouraging efficient trading through adoption of environmental 
best management practices.  In the literature, however, various factors were stated 
as probable obstacles to an efficient trading system to be operated. 
The main concern is that the land and water use decisions by non point sources that 
cause local water quality problems are very different than the point source pollution 
problems.  Most water emissions are difficult to measure, change with the weather, 
have different impacts depending on where they occur, and are the results of ever-
changing locally made and locally regulated decisions.  This is a complicated 
problem to attempt to address with trading.  In fact, recent economic research suggests that in this type of situation a great deal of political and regulatory reform 
may be necessary to interest any one in trading.     
Kydland and Prescott (1977) explained why and how people “game” regulatory 
programs; that is why and how they strategize to evade regulations and employ legal 
and political manoeuvring to avoid, delay, and reduce penalties for violating 
regulations they cannot avoid.  The area of research in environmental enforcement 
economics also address how people “game” regulatory programs, but focuses 
specifically on that little benefit/cost calculation that each regulated entity performs 
to determine whether or not to comply with a regulation. 
Studies show for an example (Stavins, 2004) that the acid trading program succeeded 
because precise individual SO2 discharge limits were established and strictly 
enforced with 100% monitoring and severe penalties for violators.  At present, most 
non point water pollution discharges are either unregulated or do not expect that 
violating regulations will be detected or will be very costly.  In consequence, they 
have little incentive to get involved in allowance trading.  Many of them are aware 
that accepting the notion that tradable discharge allowance (pollution rights) can be 
neatly defined and assigned to individual entities could undermine their long-term 
political and legal strategies for fending off regulations.  This shows in the face of 
weak, rarely enforced emission discharge restrictions and penalties for non-
compliance that are easy to avoid, few dischargers are interested in buying water 
quality credits.  Where there is no demand for water quality credits, there is no 
incentive for anyone to try to supply credits.  Thus, King (2004) argues that 
strategies to point / non point water quality trading should focus on demand-side and 
supply – side issues, rather than the institutional and technical issues that occupy the 
time of most water quality trading experts.   
Demand side issues 
Accordingly, in this case, it is useful to abandon the standard economist’s operating 
assumption  that the potential buyers willingness to pay for a water quality credit is 
based on that entity’s marginal cost of complying with nutrient discharge restrictions 
(e.g., dollars per pound of nutrient discharge reduction).  Instead, assume that the 
correct measure of an entity’s willingness to pay for a credit is expected cost of not 
complying with a government-imposed discharge restriction.  If the expected cost of 
not complying is lower than the cost of complying by purchasing credits, there is no 
economic incentive to purchase credits.  Most of the causes where water quality 
trading is being attempted, laws limiting nutrient discharges specially on non point 
sources are weak, rarely enforced, and involved such low penalties that the expected 
cost of non-compliance is near zero. The corresponding willingness to pay for 
nutrient discharge credits, therefore, is also near zero.   
According to two 2004 Nobel-winning economists Kydland and Prescott, there is a 
problem of “time inconsistency” with many regulatory programs.  They studied 
financial and real estate markets, flood insurance markets, and environmental 
compliance and observed that, people acting alone and groups, significantly 
discounted the expected cost (penalty) of not complying with a regulation if they 
believed that it would not be implemented consistently over time and could be 
influenced later.  This indicates that people tend to believe that if government yields to one kind of political pressure to pass laws restricting their polluting behaviour now, 
they can expect to yield to other political pressure later that will prevent the 
enforcement of those laws or the imposition of meaningful penalties. 
Kydland and Prescott’s research showed that the success or failure of regulatory 
systems (market based or otherwise) depends overwhelmingly on bottom-up 
microeconomics decisions regarding opportunities to game those systems, and far 
less on macroeconomic governmental decisions about how those systems are 
supposed to work.  Based on this research, it seems that enhancing the demand side 
of water quality markets will require mustering the political will to establish a 
credible system for enforcing individual allowances, and imposing meaningful 
penalties for exceeding them.    
Supply side issues 
The gaming model (as opposed to the marginal cost model) also explains what is 
inhibiting the supply side of regional water quality trading markets.  In watersheds 
where agricultural sources are significant, it is usually assumed that they will be the 
primary suppliers of water quality credits.  However, willingness of the farmers to 
supply water quality credits depend in critical ways on how it might affect their 
ability to continue receiving agricultural subsidies and green payments to and to fend 
off future environmental regulations.  According to King (2004), the main problems 
farmers face here (although they do not refer to them in these terms) are what in 
environmental trading circles have become known as baseline / additionally issues.   
To protect the integrity of trading programs, trading guidelines nearly always 
prohibit farmers from selling credits for undertaking land use/ land management 
changes that are legally required (by state regulation) or for which the farmer has 
already been paid (e.g., green payments).    Setting the baseline for credits in this 
way reduces the ability of farmers in watersheds to supply low-cost water quality 
credits.  It means producing water quality credits by implementing management 
practices that go beyond what they are already required to do will require farmers to 
somehow validate that these practices certainly reduce discharge levels.  King (2004) 
emphasized the need to establish a baseline and show additionality poses two 
problems for farmers who are considering supplying water quality credits.   
First, it requires that someone examine and document what farmers are already doing 
to meet their legal requirements in order to establish the baseline for measuring 
marketable water quality credits.  Most farmers, for obvious reasons, are not 
interested in having government representatives or their agents examining, thinking, 
and talking about the legality of their on-farm land use / land management practices 
or their justification for green payments.  Second, farmers know that their discharges 
are not regulated as much as discharges from most other sources, because 
presumably, farm discharges are too difficult to control or measure, too dependent on 
weather, and too expensive for farmers to manage.  Selling credits requires farmers 
to provide evidence to validate that they can reduce their discharges and document 
the results.  Many studies have addressed validation requirements in terms of their 
potential to increase transaction costs associated with completing market trades and 
the likelihood that these higher costs could drive a wedge between buyers and sellers.   The sources of these disincentives on the supply side of water quality trading are 
similar to those on the demand side. Weak, vague, and largely unenforced discharge 
restrictions inhibit potential suppliers from engaging in trading, just as they inhibit 
potential buyers.  Study by Breetz et al. (2005) indicates that trust and 
communication barriers have contributed significantly to the lethargic performance 
of many point-non point source water quality trading programs.  They have 
employed the social embeddedness theory to analyze three mechanism of 
communicating with farmers and conduct a case study analysis of 12 water quality 
trading programs.  They revealed that employing trustworthy third parties or 
embedded ties may reduce farmers’ reluctance to participate, although the most 
effective mechanism ultimately depends on local conditions and program objectives. 
The proposed emission trading in the lake Taupo area is not an exception of the 
above mentioned theories.   Further, the small size of the proposed market and the 
trading between NPS sources will certainly enhanced the ineffectiveness of the 
proposed system. 
Water Quality Trading in the USA 
A recently compiled survey data base by Breetz et al. (2004) was employed to study 
the unique features of water quality trading markets in the USA.  The trading in the 
USA has been explored in the context of stringent discharge limits, or watershed-
wide caps like Total Maximum daily Loads (TMDL).  Most trading programs and 
policies focus on trading between point sources and non point sources (Table 3).  
Table 3: Major Trading Types in the USA Water Trading Markets 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Trading type                              Number of programs                                  % 
____________________________________________________________________ 
NPS-NPS                                                  1                                               0.02 
PS-PS                                                        8                                                 17    
PS-NPS                                                     21                                               46 
PS-PS: PS-NPS                                         07                                               15 
PS-NPS: NPS-NPS                                   04                                               08 
PS-PS: PS-NPS: NPS-NPS                       05                                               13 
____________________________________________________________________ 
  The nutrient trades were mostly nitrogen and phosphorus.  In many cases, trading 
programs are in place for fairly large watersheds with many possible non-point 
trading partners.  Point sources are often held liable for the trades with non-point sources.  Uncertainty associated with non-point source control is frequently mitigated 
through trading ratios by requiring non-point sources to more than offset the increase 
in a point source loading.  Trading ratios are also used to account for differences in 
the location of sources in a watershed and for ensuring a net water quality 
improvement from a trade.  Total trade programs reported in the survey is 46. The 
total trading programs are consists of on-going offset trading programs; one time 
offset agreement, state and regional trading policies, and other projects and recent 
proposals that involve trading. Actual trade or offsets occurred in 19 cases (41%).  
Of the ongoing trading programs, only four (.08%) experienced a large number of 
trades.  Only one program (.02%) reported trading between non-point source 
polluters.  This program is based in the California and called the Grassland area 
farmers tradable load program.   This is a regional consortium of seven irrigation and 
drainage districts in the San Joaquim valley, administers an internal cap-and trade 
program for Selenum.  Each district in grassland area farmers is allocated a portion 
of the collective Selenium cap, which was established as part of the Grassland bypass 
project.  The district level selenium cap forms the basis for trading.  The unique 
feature of this program is that the selenium loading from irrigated agriculture is 
accurately measured at the drainage pumps, thus more or less similar to a point-point 
trading program.  Further, individual farmers are not directly participating in trading.  
Selenium load allocation and accountability remains at the district level.  Therefore, 
it is very difficult to conclude this program as a successful trading program between 
non point source polluters. 
Expert in the literature often argue that the extent to which trading occurs depends, in 
part, on market size.  A thin market like propose trading market in Taupo Lake area, 
one in which there are fewer buyers and sellers, may offer fewer opportunities for 
trading.  Table 4 offers two indicators of market size for off set trading programs: 
geographic size and the number of sources in the watershed that can potentially trade.  
The geographic size of the watersheds ranges from 3200 acres to 4.1 million acre.  
Most of trading programs that allowed trading with non point sources have a large 
quantity of potential non traders.  The exception to this is in cases where non point 
sources have been aggregated into irrigation districts. The Grassland area Farmers 
Tradable Load Program in California has seven irrigation districts, while the Lower 
Boise River in Idaho has eight irrigation districts.  The number of point sources in a 
trading program ranges from 4 to 314.   
Trades have occurred in 11 of the offset/ trading programs.  Within these 11 
programs, four programs have had only one trade, one program has had two trades, 
and two programs have had three trades since inception.  The most successful 
programs in terms of the number of trades have been the Grass Land Area Farmers 
Tradable Loads (39 trades over a two year period), Long Island Sound (63 trades 
over a two-year period), Truckee River (33 trades over an eight year period), and the 
Red Cedar River (22 trades each year since 2001) programs.  The total amount traded 
of a particular pollutant varies widely across programs.  For the more active  
 
Table 4- Geographic and Market Size of US Offset/ Trading Programs 
____________________________________________________________________ Program Name                                   Size of watershed (acres)        Sources 
____________________________________________________________________ 
1. Grassland farmers tradable program    97,000                            7 I & D districts                              
2. Bear Creek, Colorado                          83,700                               14 PS 
3. Charfield Reservoir, Colorado           1.92 million                      7 PS & many NPS 
4. Cherry Creek, Colorado                     243,000                            6 PS & many NPS 
5. Lake Dillon                                        3,200                                  4 PS, 1000 NPS 
6. Long Island Sound, Connecticut        3.5 million                         79 PS, many NPS 
7. Lower Boise River, Idaho                   41,000                               10 PS, 8 districts   
8. Chales River, Massachusetts              197,000     
9. Kalamazoo River, Michigan               1.28 million                      50 PS, many NPS      
10. Truckee River Quality  
      Settlement agreement                        1.4 million                        3 PS & many NPS 
11. Passaic valley Sewrage 
      Pre treatment trading, New Jersey      534,000                               260 PS 
12.   New York City, watershed  
       offset pilot program                          1.26 million                  100 PS & many NPS 
13. Neuse River Basin, North Carolina   3.96 million                  22 PS & many NPS 
14. Tar-Pamlico Basin, North Carolina    2.88 million                 16 PS & many NPS 
15. Fox-Wolf Basin, Wisconsin              4.1 million                   100s PS & many NPS    
16. Red Cedar River, Wisconsin            1.92 million                   18 PS & many NPS 
17. Rock River, Wisconsin                     1.15 million                   60 PS & many NPS 
____________________________________________________________________ 
programs, such as Long Island Sound, trading has resulted in a substantial amount of 
the pollutant has been traded each year (2.7 lbs of Nitrogen).  In other cases, a very 
small amount of pollutant has been traded (for instance, only 2lbs. of Phosphorus 
were traded in the Chartfield Reservoir program). The most common reason given for a lack of trades, even for programs that had trade, 
is that point sources have been able to meet their limits without trading either 
because the limits were not strict enough or other initiatives made trade unnecessary.  
The high cost of trades, regulatory obstacles, difficulty in identifying sellers, and 
uncertainty over trading rules are also listed as reasons why trades have not occurred.  
Table 5, extracted from Morgan and Wolverton (2005) describes the various reasons 
cited by the projects and proposals as the biggest challenges to implementing these 
programs.  Two of the most common challenges are identifying participants for 
trading, and uncertainties related calculating the number of credits generated by non-
point source activities. These two reasons could be identified as the main obstacles 
for the propose trading in the Lake Taupo case too.  As pointed out by Sundakov 
(2006) the debatable issue of effectiveness of ‘overseer’ the  nutrient leaching 
estimator would complicated the issue further in case of emission trading among the 
non point sources. The other challenges include negotiating trading rules, market and 
price uncertainties, and regulatory drivers. 
Conclusion 
Some of the basic principles that govern the effectiveness of market mechanisms to 
address the externalities are seem to be violating in the case of applying market 
based instruments to address the problem of Lake Taupo pollution.  Despite this 
reality emission trading is being currently considered as an effective tool to counter 
the problem.  Simply, emission trading is a blend of regulatory and market 
mechanism.  The problem of regulatory part (20% reduction of current level of N2 
loading to the Lake) is that there is no enough evidence to prove that even a perfect 
achievement of this level will guarantee a healthy state of Lake.  According to 
Hamilton and Wilkins (2005), for no net increase in nutrient loads to Lake Taupo 
over current levels, the 20% nitrogen reduction is likely to be conservative 
considering major recent intensification of fertilizer use for pastoral lands and the 
comparatively large contribution to the nitrogen load from unmanageable sources.  
The other main problem lies in the terms of high transaction costs due to the fact that 
trade is mainly going to be among non point source polluters.  Further, demand and 
supply side problems will be considerable as the concerned market is very small and 
also due the possible gaming behaviour of farmers as explained by Kydland and 
Prescott (1977).  In this regard, the research should be focused on the employing 
market base instruments to divert farmers from high leaching farming activities to 
environmental friendly non farming activities at least in the most sensitive areas of 
the Lake.  Exploring the markets for environmental services by employing market 
base instruments might be a potential alternative in this regard. 
 
 
 Table 5: Biggest Implementation Challenges for Trading Programs 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Program name                                       Biggest implementation challenge 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Grassland Area Farmers, California    Establishing a reasonable price for trades 
Bear Creek, Colorado                           Reporting standards not met, compliance    
                                                              Issues for small farms 
Chat field Reservoir, Colorado             Measuring water quality changes from NPS 
                                                              Reductions, NPS involvement. 
Cherry Creek, Colorado                        Lack of pressure on PSs. 
Clear Creek, Colorado                           No guidance on orphan site trading; financial 
                                                                Resources 
Lake Dillon, Colorado                            Limited demand for credits, NPS monitoring 
Long Island Sound, Connecticut            Continued funding 
Lower Boise River, Idaho                      TMDL passage, NPS participation 
Kalamazoo River, Michigan                 Negotiation of trading rules; identification of  
                                                               PS and NPS participation. 
Truckee River quality settlement        Water rights highly contentious, finding sellers 
Tar-Pamlico Basin, North Carolina     Difficulty predicting cost share funds; staffing 
Fox-Wolf Basin, Wisconsin                Lack of regulatory driver, high transaction cost 
Red Cedar River, Wisconsin               Determine credits available from BMPs;  
                                                             Administrative costs; NPS participation. 
Rock river, Wisconsin                         Establishing trade ratios; limits on BMPs 
____________________________________________________________________  
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